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1To protect the identity of the disabled plaintiff, these
proceedings and those underlying it refer to the child, C.H., by
his initials only.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
            
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from an order of the District Court,
entered July 22, 2008, granting summary judgment in favor of
the Cape Henlopen School District (the “District”) and denying
appellants’ claim for reimbursement of private school tuition
and other related costs for their disabled child under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400, et seq.  Appellants claim that the District’s failure to
have an individualized educational program (IEP) in effect for
their child on the first day of classes warranted their unilateral
decision to remove their child from the public school and place
him in a private residential school for students with disabilities.
Because procedural violations of the IDEA do not merit tuition
reimbursement absent a showing of substantive harm, and
because unreasonable parent conduct warrants equitable
reduction of an award under the IDEA, we will affirm the order
of the District Court.
I.
Plaintiff, C.H., was a minor child during the 2006-2007
school year.1  C.H. has been diagnosed with dyslexia,
dysgraphia, and a severe language disorder and may also suffer
2We will refer to the Parents collectively, though it is
clear that C.H.’s mother, who proceeds pro se before this Court,
was the active participant in most or all of the relevant
proceedings.  Although C.H. is no longer a minor, he continues
to proceed by and through his Parents.
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from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a
central auditory processing disorder.  C.H. has thus been
identified as a child with a learning disability under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401 and 29 U.S.C. § 705 since the 1998-1999 school year.
In the relevant time period, C.H. and his parents resided in the
Cape Henlopen School District.
The dispute between C.H.’s parents (the “Parents”)2 and
the District over the provision of adequate educational resources
for C.H. is longstanding.  Since 2000, the Parents have
unilaterally withdrawn C.H. from the District and placed him in
private school on two separate occasions – once in 2002 and
again in 2004.  In both instances the Parents sought
reimbursement from the District for private school tuition and in
both instances the District opposed reimbursement.  Ultimately,
the District and the Parents entered into a Settlement Agreement
regarding only the 2005-2006 school year under which the
District agreed to pay C.H.’s tuition and certain educational
costs at the Gow School, a private residential school for boys
with language-based learning disabilities.  The Agreement
provided that the placement was the sole decision of the Parents,
that the District’s tuition obligations pertained only to the 2005-
2006 year, and that the District was under no obligation to
monitor C.H.’s performance or develop an IEP for C.H. while
he was enrolled at the Gow School.
3The Psychologist later made an addendum to the report
after additional documents arrived from the Gow School.
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During the 2005-2006 school year, the Parents discussed
with the District C.H.’s potential return to the District for the
following year and the need to develop an IEP for C.H.
However, the Parents never definitively stated that C.H. would
return to the District for the 2006-2007 school year, and had in
fact already enrolled C.H. in the Gow School for the 2006-2007
school year as of March 2006.  Despite this uncertainty, the
District determined that it should evaluate C.H. and develop an
IEP in the event C.H. returned to the District.  Accordingly, in
May 2006, the District sought authorization from the Parents to
evaluate C.H.  The Parents returned the initial permission form
without properly checking the box authorizing the evaluation.
The District notified the Parents of this oversight and obtained
the properly executed authorization on July 6, 2006.  A District
Psychologist contacted the Parents on July 24, 2006, to schedule
the evaluation.  The Psychologist evaluated C.H. on August 7
and 14, 2006, and completed an evaluation report on August 15,
2006.3
On August 18, the District sent a notice to the Parents
that an IEP team meeting was scheduled for August 22 to review
the results of the evaluation and to develop or revise an IEP for
C.H.  Although the notice came less than ten days before the
meeting, in violation of the IDEA notice requirements, C.H.’s
mother signed a written waiver of the notice requirement in
order to permit the meeting to proceed.
6The IEP meeting took place as scheduled on August 22
with C.H.’s mother in attendance.  The District Psychologist
reviewed his findings and concluded that C.H. remained eligible
for special services.  However, because of scheduling conflicts
of certain members of the IEP team, the meeting concluded
before C.H.’s IEP was finalized.  Although the District
expressed its willingness to promptly schedule a continuation of
the meeting, C.H.’s mother indicated that her travel schedule
made her unable to meet again until after the start of the 2006-
2007 school year.  The District proposed that the meeting be
continued on September 11, 2006, five days after the first day of
classes in the District.  C.H.’s mother stated that she had a
scheduling conflict with the proposed date, but agreed to
tentatively schedule the meeting for September 11.  She testified
that she anticipated notice of the rescheduled meeting.  The
District did not send the Parents a written notice confirming the
continuation of the IEP meeting.
C.H. did not report to class in the District on the first day
of the public school year, September 6, 2006.  Rather, his
Parents had unilaterally chosen to have him begin classes at the
Gow School on September 5, 2006.  The Parents did not notify
the District at any point in advance of placing C.H. in the Gow
School that they intended to seek reimbursement for his tuition
from the District.
On September 7, 2006, one day after the start of District
classes, the Parents filed a request for a due process hearing
before the Department of Education Hearing Panel (the
“Hearing Panel”).  Despite this due process request, the District
intended to proceed with the September 11 meeting.  On
7September 8, the District sent a letter to the Gow School inviting
a representative to participate in person or by conference call.
C.H.’s mother was sent a copy of this letter.  On the morning of
September 11, approximately one hour before the scheduled
meeting time, the District received a phone call from the Gow
School indicating that its representative would not participate in
the meeting because C.H.’s mother had informed them that she
would not be attending.  The Parents later advised the District
that, in light of their due process complaint, they would no
longer participate in IEP meetings with the District.
Additionally, the Parents refused to give the District permission
to conduct a speech and language evaluation of C.H., which was
necessary in order to develop his IEP.
The Hearing Panel convened in December 2006 to
consider the Parents’ due process complaint.  As the Hearing
Panel parsed it, the Parents raised five claims.  The first four the
Panel treated as alleged procedural violations:  the District failed
to develop an IEP during the 2005-2006 year while C.H. was at
the Gow School, the District failed to provide an IEP for the
2006-2007 year as of the first day of the school year; the District
failed to provide the required ten-day notice of the proposed IEP
meetings; and the District failed to provide the speech and
language evaluation necessary to develop an IEP.  The final
claim the Panel treated as substantive:  the District failed to
review and consider the appropriate documentation of C.H.’s
performance in conducting his psychological evaluation.  As a
remedy, the Parents sought the full cost of tuition and all related
costs for C.H.’s enrollment in the Gow School for the 2006-
2007 school year.
4The Complaint also asserts the District Court’s
jurisdiction under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794, et seq., and Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
without any further factual or legal development.  The District
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The Hearing Panel conducted a two-day evidentiary
hearing, which included testimony from the District Supervisor
of Special Programs, the District Psychologist, the Cape
Henlopen Principal, the District Special Education Coordinator,
the Director of the middle school at Gow School, the Director of
the upper school at Gow School, and the District Supervisor of
Instructional Support for Special Programs.  C.H.’s mother also
testified.
Prior to the inception of the hearings, and again in
between the two days of testimony, the Parents sought the
recusal of the members of the Hearing Panel based on
allegations of bias and the Panel members’ supposed inability to
understand the IDEA.  Each member of the Panel considered the
recusal request and determined that he/she was not biased and
could ably render a decision in the matter.
On January 6, 2007, the Panel issued its decision.  The
Hearing Panel concluded that all of the Parents’ claims – both
procedural and substantive – failed under the IDEA because the
alleged deficiencies on the District’s part did not act to deprive
C.H. of a free and appropriate public education.
On April 5, 2007, the Parents filed a Complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware seeking
review of the Hearing Panel decision.4  The parties filed cross-
Court did not address these claims.  The Parents do not raise the
Rehabilitation Act claim on appeal, and we address the Section
1983 claim infra, in Part III.D.
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motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted
summary judgment to the District and denied summary
judgment to the Parents, joining in the reasoning of the Hearing
Panel and noting that the Parents’ conduct in delaying and then
refusing to participate in the IEP meetings, and subsequent
refusal to authorize the speech and language evaluation, was a
substantial contributing factor to any alleged delays in the IEP
development.  This timely appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
The IDEA directs that a reviewing court “is obliged to
conduct a modified de novo review, giving ‘due weight’ to the
underlying administrative proceedings.”  S.H. v. State-Operated
Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting MM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523,
530-31 (4th Cir. 2002)).  Factual findings from the
administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie
correct.  Id.  We exercise plenary review over the legal
conclusions reached by the District Court.  See Lauren W. v.
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2007).
III.
5The Parents do not raise the substantive claim related to
the sufficiency of the documentation reviewed by the District
Psychologist in their brief on appeal.
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On appeal, the Parents raise two categories of claims.
First, they allege that various procedural violations of the IDEA
warrant an award of tuition reimbursement for C.H.’s private
education for the 2006-2007 school year.5  Second, they allege
that the conduct of the Hearing Panel violated their right to due
process.  The District argues that the alleged procedural
violations did not deprive C.H. of any educational benefit, and,
alternatively, that the Parents’ conduct warrants equitable denial
of reimbursement.  We will address these arguments in turn.
A. Background
Under the IDEA, a state receiving federal educational
funding must provide children within that state a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE).  See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1412(a)(1)(A), 1401(9).  The FAPE required by the Act is
tailored to the unique needs of the child by means of an
“individualized educational program.”  See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
An appropriate IEP must contain statements concerning a
disabled child’s level of functioning, set forth measurable annual
achievement goals, describe the services to be provided, and
establish objective criteria for evaluating the child’s progress.
See id.
The IDEA sets out a variety of procedures to be followed
in the creation of the IEP.  For instance, the IEP is to be
prepared at a meeting including a qualified representative of the
6The attendance of any of such individuals may be
waived by agreement between the parent or guardian and the
local educational agency, or by prior written input from the
absent party.  Id. § 1414(d)(1)(C).
11
local educational agency, the child’s teacher, a special education
teacher, the child’s parent or guardian, and, where appropriate,
the child.  Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).6  The local educational agency is
to provide the parent with “[w]ritten prior notice” of “any
evaluation procedures such agency proposes to conduct[,]” id.
§ 1414(b)(1), or when the agency proposes or refuses to initiate
a change in the “identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child,” id. § 1415(b)(3).  In addition, the statute
requires that,
[a]t the beginning of each school year, each local
educational agency, State educational agency, or
other State agency, as the case may be, shall have
in effect, for each child with a disability in the
agency’s jurisdiction, an individualized education
program, as defined in paragraph (1)(A).
Id. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The IDEA establishes a private cause of action against a
school district that fails to abide by its legal obligations.  The
parent or guardian of a minor student who is denied the rights
and procedures set forth in the IDEA is afforded the opportunity
to file an administrative complaint and to appeal an adverse
determination to a federal district court.  Id. §§ 1415(b)(6),
(i)(2).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has directed that a
12
school district’s liability for violations of the IDEA is a two-fold
inquiry:  (1) Has the school district complied with the
procedures set forth in IDEA?; and (2) Has the school district
fulfilled its obligation to provide the student with a FAPE?  See
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982).
While a failure to satisfy either requirement may merit
court-ordered relief, the appropriate relief depends on which
requirement is not met.  A plaintiff who alleges the denial of a
FAPE may seek compensatory relief in the form of appropriate
educational services within the district (referred to as
“compensatory education”) or tuition reimbursement for an
appropriate placement in private school.  See Mary T. v. Sch.
Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009).  On the other
hand, a plaintiff alleging only that a school district has failed to
comply with a procedural requirement of the IDEA, independent
of any resulting deprivation of a FAPE, may only seek
injunctive relief for prospective compliance.  See P.P. ex rel.
Michael P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Erickson v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 199
F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ompensatory
education is not an appropriate remedy for a procedural
violation of the IDEA.”)).
In some cases, a procedural violation may rise to the level
of a denial of a FAPE, entitling the plaintiff to compensatory
education or tuition reimbursement.  However, “[a] procedural
violation of the IDEA is not a per se denial of a FAPE; rather,
a school district’s failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Act will constitute a denial of a FAPE only
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if such violation causes substantive harm to the child or his
parents.”  Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238
F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also D.S.
v. Bayonne Bd. of Education, No. 08-4730, ___ F.3d ___, 2010
WL 1610591, at * 9-11 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2010) (“A procedural
violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss
of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives
parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of
educational benefits.”); Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328
F.3d 804, 811-12 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[P]rocedural defects alone do
not constitute a violation of the right to a FAPE unless they
result in the loss of an educational opportunity.”); DiBuo v. Bd.
of Educ., 309 F.3d 184, 190 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A] violation of a
procedural requirement of the IDEA (or one of its implementing
regulations) must actually interfere with the provision of a
FAPE.”).  Under the implementing regulations, substantive harm
occurs only if the preponderance of the evidence indicates that
the procedural inadequacies (i) [i]mpeded the
child’s right to a FAPE; (ii) significantly impeded
the parent’s opportunity to participate in the
decision-making process regarding the provision
of a FAPE to the parent’s child; or (iii) caused a
deprivation of the educational benefit.
34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2).
Where a parent unilaterally places a child into private
school, a court or hearing officer may require reimbursement of
private school expenses where it finds there has been a
substantive harm – namely, that “the agency had not made a
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[FAPE] available to the child in a timely manner.”  20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  However, even where private placement
is appropriate and reimbursement is otherwise due, the IDEA
permits the equitable reduction or elimination of tuition
reimbursement under certain circumstances.  The statute
provides, in relevant part:
The cost of reimbursement . . . may be reduced or
denied-
(I) if-
(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the
parents attended prior to removal of the
child from the public school, the parents
did not inform the IEP Team that they
were rejecting the placement proposed by
the public agency to provide a free
appropriate public education to their child,
including stating their concerns and their
intent to enroll their child in a private
school at public expense; or
(bb) 10 business days (including any
holidays that occur on a business day)
prior to the removal of the child from the
public school, the parents did not give
written notice to the public agency of the
information described in item (aa);
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(II) if, prior to the parents’ removal of the child
from the public school, the public agency
informed the parents, through the notice
requirements described in section 1415(b)(3) of
this title, of its intent to evaluate the child
(including a statement of the purpose of the
evaluation that was appropriate and reasonable),
but the parents did not make the child available
for such evaluation; or
(III) upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness
with respect to actions taken by the parents.
Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).
B. Tuition Reimbursement for Procedural
Violations of the IDEA
The Parents here seek tuition reimbursement for C.H.’s
private education at the Gow School.  (Compl. Relief ¶¶ d-g.)
Thus, in order to recover, the Parents must demonstrate that the
District violated the IDEA in a way that caused a substantive
harm – either by depriving C.H. of an educational benefit or
significantly impeding the Parents’ participation in the decision-
making process regarding C.H.’s education.  The Parents
premise their alleged harm on the District’s procedural
violations of the IDEA.  These procedural violations take two
principal forms:  the District’s failure to have an IEP in place on
the first day of the 2006-2007 school year, and the District’s
failure to notify the Parents ten days prior to any scheduled IEP
7In fact, the Parents allege a host of procedural violations
over the course of the year preceding the 2006-2007 school year,
including the District’s failure to complete the speech and
language evaluation that C.H. needed before the District could
develop an IEP.  (See Parents’ Br. 11 (“[T]he District’s
procedural violations began in December of 2005 when they
recommended evaluations.”).)  However, these alleged
procedural violations really boil down to one essential
complaint:  that the District failed to take the necessary steps to
timely develop an IEP.  Accordingly, we will address these
allegations as related claims in support of the Parents’
contention that the failure to have an IEP in place on the first
day of the school year denied C.H. a FAPE.
16
meeting.7  The District Court reasoned that these procedural
violations, to the extent they occurred, did not rise to the level
of the denial of a FAPE.  We agree.
1. Failure to Develop an IEP as of the First Day
of Classes
There is no dispute that the District failed to have an IEP
in place on the first day of the 2006-2007 school year.  This is
a violation of the plain mandate of the IDEA that a District
should have an IEP in place “[a]t the beginning of each school
year.”  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).  Thus, acknowledging that a
procedural violation has occurred, we must determine whether,
under the circumstances, this violation can meaningfully be said
to have “[i]mpeded the child’s right to a FAPE” or “caused a
deprivation of [an] educational benefit.”  Id. § 300.513(a)(2)(i),
(iii).
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The Fourth Circuit considered this question under similar
circumstances in MM v. School District of Greenville County,
303 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2002).  In Greenville, a four year-old
child (“MM”) suffered from a form of dystrophy and mild
autism and was enrolled in a public preschool program,
receiving special services under the IDEA.  Id. at 528.  Her
parents also participated in a private in-home program for
autism when MM was not in preschool.  Id.  For the 1995-1996
school year, MM had an IEP in place that the parents had
approved.  Id.  In May of 1996, the IEP team convened to
reassess MM’s progress and proposed an IEP that did not
include “extended school year” services to cover a summer
educational program for MM.  Id. at 528-29.  The parents
objected and the IEP was not agreed to for the 1996-1997 school
year.  Id. at 529.  A subsequent meeting on August 8 was
similarly unsuccessful, in large part because the parents insisted
that the in-home autism treatment should be part of the IEP.  Id.
A third meeting was scheduled for August 22, but the parents
cancelled the meeting.  Id.  The parents then unilaterally decided
to enroll MM in a private kindergarten program, and she never
attended classes in the public school district for the 1996-1997
school year.  Id.
In assessing the parents’ claim for reimbursement of
MM’s private tuition costs, the court considered whether the
school district’s failure to have an IEP in place before the start
of classes “resulted in the loss of an educational opportunity for
the disabled child, or whether . . . it was a mere technical
contravention of the IDEA.”  Id. at 533.  Under the facts of that
case, the court reasoned that “the District was willing to offer
MM a FAPE, and that it had attempted to do so[,]” and that “her
18
parents had a full opportunity to participate in the development
of the Proposed 1996-97 IEP.”  Id. at 534.  Additionally, there
was no evidence that MM suffered any educational loss because
her parents “would [not] have accepted any FAPE offered by the
District that did not included reimbursement for the [in-home
autism] program” and “MM suffered no prejudice from the
District’s failure to agree to her parents’ demands.”  Id. at 535.
The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause this procedural
defect did not result in any lost educational opportunity for
MM,” the reimbursement claim failed.  Id.  The court further
admonished, “it would be improper to hold [the] School District
liable for the procedural violation of failing to have the IEP
completed and signed, when that failure was the result of [the
parents’] lack of cooperation.”  Id. at 534 (quoting district court
slip op. at 15).
On the other hand, we note the Sixth Circuit, in Knable
v. Bexley City School District, 238 F.3d 755, 766-67 (6th Cir.
2001), held that a “draft” IEP did not satisfy the IDEA and that
the school district’s failure to formulate a final IEP prior to the
start of the school year resulted in a denial of FAPE.  However,
central to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis was the fact that the school
district there never convened an IEP meeting, either before or
after the start of the school year, and that the disabled student
enrolled in the district for the school year and never received an
IEP.  Thus, the court reasoned, “the absence of an IEP at any
time during [the child’s] sixth-grade year caused [him] to lose
educational opportunity.”  Id. at 766.
Reconciling these approaches, we find the Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in Greenville highly persuasive in our
19
present analysis.  The District here demonstrated consistent
willingness to evaluate C.H. and to develop an IEP for the 2006-
2007 school year.  Despite some initial delays in finalizing the
authorization, C.H. was evaluated by a District psychologist a
month before the start of school and an IEP team convened
shortly thereafter to develop his educational program.  Although
the IEP was not completed in the first meeting, it was the
Parents and not the District who delayed the continuation of that
meeting until after the start of classes, and ultimately terminated
the process by filing a due process request.  Like the court in
Greenville, we decline to hold that a school district is liable for
procedural violations that are thrust upon it by uncooperative
parents.
Additionally, we lack the essential element in the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis in Knable:  the ability to determine whether
the failure to develop an IEP on the first day of classes would
have resulted in a lost educational benefit for the disabled child.
C.H. never attended a single class in the District in the 2006-
2007 school year.  The Parents enrolled C.H. in Gow on the
presumption that the District’s failure to have the IEP in place
on the first day would deprive C.H. of an educational benefit.
Neither the Hearing Panel nor the District Court credited this
presumption as fact.  Rather, the Hearing Panel reasoned that an
IEP could have been developed for C.H. within a week of the
start of the school year, had C.H. remained in the District and
had the Parents continued to cooperate.  We will not disrupt that
determination in the face of mere supposition.
Absent any evidence that C.H. would have suffered an
educational loss, we are left only to determine whether the
20
failure to have an IEP in place on the first day of school is,
itself, the loss of an educational benefit.  While we do not
sanction a school district’s failure to provide an IEP for even a
de minimis period, we decline to hold as a matter of law that any
specific period of time without an IEP is a denial of a FAPE in
the absence of specific evidence of an educational deprivation.
As the Supreme Court has cautioned, “parents who unilaterally
change their child’s placement during the pendency of review
proceedings, without the consent of state or local school
officials, do so at their own financial risk.”  Florence County
Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
Accordingly, the District’s failure to have an IEP in place
on the first day of classes did not deprive C.H. of a FAPE, and
reimbursement on that basis was properly denied.
2. Failure to Provide Ten-Day Notice of IDEA
Meetings
Next we turn to the question of whether any alleged
failure on the District’s part to timely notify the Parents of IEP
meetings “significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process regarding the
provision of a FAPE[.]”  34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2)(ii).
As explained above, the IDEA contains a notice
provision, requiring prior written notice to parents whenever an
agency proposes or refuses to initiate or change “the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child,
or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).  These procedures are designed
8The District Court concluded that, because the
September 11 meeting was merely a continuation of the
August 22 meeting, no new notice was necessary.  (Dist. Ct. Slip
21
to ensure that the parents of a child with a disability are both
notified of decisions affecting their child and given an
opportunity to object to these decisions.  See id. § 1415(a).  Thus
in cases where a violation of a notification requirement does not
actually impair the parents’ knowledge of, or participation in,
educational decisions, the violation is not a substantive harm
under the IDEA.  See, e.g., Gadsby by Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109
F.3d 940, 956 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that parents received late
notice with ample time to respond and holding that “[b]ecause
any violation of the notice provisions did not interfere with the
provision of a free appropriate public education to [the child],
these violations cannot subject [the district] to liability for
reimbursement of [private school] tuition”).
We are not persuaded that the alleged notification
violations here impaired the Parents’ ability to participate in the
IEP meetings.  As to the first meeting on August 22, C.H.’s
mother signed a written waiver of ten-day notice of IEP
meetings, leading the District Court to correctly conclude that
no notice violation occurred.  However, even if a violation had
occurred, the Parents do not claim it had any effect on their
ability to participate fully in the meeting, and C.H.’s mother
attended the August 22 meeting without objection.
Further, the Parents do not allege that they were unaware
of the September 11 continuation of the IEP meeting, only that
they did not receive the formal notice required by the IDEA.8  In
Op. 13.)  The Parents insist they were owed additional notice
under the IDEA.  Because we agree that the notice violation,
even if it had occurred, does not constitute a denial of a FAPE,
we need not resolve this dispute.
22
fact, C.H.’s mother testified that she was present when the
District scheduled the meeting for September 11, though she
says she did not commit to it and expected notice when the date
was finalized.  She further testified that the reason she did not
attend the September 11 meeting was because she had filed for
due process, not because she was unaware of the meeting
schedule.
The procedural requirements of the IDEA governing
notice of IEP meetings are intended to ensure parental
participation in the IEP process, not to provide the Parents with
a hook on which to hang a tuition reimbursement claim.  It is
clear to us, as it was to the District Court, that the Parents have
been their own greatest impediment to participation in the
evaluation of C.H.’s disabilities and the development of an
appropriate IEP.  We therefore affirm the District Court’s
rejection of the argument that any notice deficiencies rise to the
level of substantive harm.
C. Equitable Reduction of Reimbursement
Although we hold that C.H. was not denied a FAPE and
therefore cannot seek tuition reimbursement for his private
education, we agree with the District that, alternatively,
equitable considerations weigh against granting the relief sought
by the Parents.  Even where a District is found to be in violation
9Although Forest Grove was decided after the District
Court’s consideration of this matter, the principles stated therein
with regard to equitable relief under the IDEA are not new.  See
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374
(1985) (“[E]quitable considerations are relevant in fashioning
relief” under the IDEA).
10The IDEA provides for exceptions where
reimbursement need not be denied despite the failure of the
parents to notify the school district of their intent to place their
child in private school – for example where the parents were not
notified of the notice requirement or where compliance would
result in harm to the child.  See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(IV).  The Parents have not alleged the
application of any of these exceptions here.
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of the IDEA and private school placement is deemed
appropriate, “courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a
reimbursement award if the equities so warrant.”  Forest Grove
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009).9  The IDEA
directs that an award of private school tuition “may be reduced
or denied” under a variety of circumstances, including “upon a
judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions
taken by the parents,” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III), or
where parents fail to give the school district ten days notice prior
to enrolling a child in private school,  id.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb).10
There is no question here that the Parents unilaterally
withdrew C.H. from the District without any prior notice to the
District.  Further, there is no question that the Parents’ conduct
11In actuality, the Parents mistakenly cite 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.514 for the proposition that “[n]o change in identification,
evaluation, program, educational placement or IEP may be made
during the process of a hearing unless agreed to by both parties.”
(Parents’ Br. 11.)  Although this overstates the command of
§ 1415(j), we construe the citation as a reference to 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.518(a), the implementing regulation of § 1415(j).
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in delaying the continuation of the IEP meeting and cancelling
the speech and language evaluation substantially precluded any
possibility that the District could timely develop an appropriate
IEP for C.H. and provide the necessary services to him, or that
the parties could resolve this dispute without resort to litigation.
The District argues that this conduct warrants equitable denial
of reimbursement, as allowed by statute.
In response, the Parents contend that their refusal to
continue with IEP development or permit evaluation of C.H.
after they filed their due process request is a right conferred on
them by the IDEA.  For this proposition, they refer to § 1415(j),
which provides:
[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings
conducted pursuant to this section, unless the
State or local educational agency and the parents
. . . otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the
then-current educational placement of such child
. . . .
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a).11
Commonly referred to as the “stay-put” provision, § 1415(j)
12The resolution session can be waived by agreement of
the parties.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV).  The record
does not reflect whether the Parents and the District here waived
the resolution session.
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protects the status quo of a child’s educational placement while
a parent challenges a proposed change to, or elimination of,
services.
The Parents grossly misread the effect of this provision.
The stay-put provision merely ensures that a disabled child’s
educational services are not altered or reduced until the parent
has an opportunity to avail herself of the appeal procedures.
The stay-put provision was never intended to suspend or
otherwise frustrate the ongoing cooperation of parents and the
school district to reach an amenable resolution of a disagreement
over educational services.  In fact, the IDEA specifically
obligates the parents to participate in a resolution session with
the school district after a due process request is filed “where the
parents of the child discuss their complaint, and the facts that
form the basis of the complaint, and the local educational
agency is provided the opportunity to resolve the complaint.”
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV).12  The inclusion of a
mandatory resolution session clearly reflects Congress’ intention
that parents and school districts continue to work toward the
resolution of disputes and the provision of appropriate
educational services even after a due process request is filed.
See also Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53
(2005) (“The core of the [IDEA] . . . is the cooperative process
that it establishes between parents and schools.”).  The stay-put
provision does not, therefore, excuse the Parents, who based
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their complaint on the absence of an IEP, from continuing to
meet with the District to rectify the perceived wrong.
The Parents here have disregarded their obligation to
cooperate and assist in the formulation of an IEP, and failed to
timely notify the District of their intent to seek private school
tuition reimbursement.  We believe these are among the
“unreasonable[] . . . actions taken by the parents,” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III), that Congress contemplated when it
gave courts the authority to equitably reduce or eliminate tuition
reimbursement.  See Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496 (noting
instance of unreasonableness where “the parents failed to give
the school district adequate notice of their intent to enroll the
child in private school”).  The IDEA was not intended to fund
private school tuition for the children of parents who have not
first given the public school a good faith opportunity to meet its
obligations.  See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d
893, 995 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The law ought not to abet parties who
block assembly of the required team and then, dissatisfied with
the ensuing IEP, attempt to jettison it because of problems
created by their own obstructionism.”).  Accordingly, we also
will also affirm the denial of the Parents’ request for tuition
reimbursement on equitable grounds.
D. Section 1983 Claim for Denial of Due Process
in State Administrative Proceedings
Finally, on appeal, the Parents contend that the District
Court erred in failing to separately address their claim that the
conduct of the Hearing Panel, in denying certain procedures,
violated their rights to procedural due process.  Specifically, the
13Neither can the Parents tie any alleged procedural
deficiencies before the Hearing Panel into their requested
remedies under the IDEA.  The IDEA states that a party “shall
have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the
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Parents allege that the Hearing Panel “made no findings of facts
based on determination of testimonial credibility[,]” “refused to
rule on the Plaintiff Parent’s right to review the child’s entire
educational record for evidentiary disclosure[,]” and that the
Panel chairperson “utiliz[ed] leading questions, had the witness
rephrase her answers to conform to the answers provided by the
Panel Chairperson[,] . . . and requested the District recall a
witness for rebuttal so she could ask questions.”  (Parents’ Br.
3-4.)  Presumably these allegations are premised on some of the
same perceived deficiencies that led the Parents to repeatedly
seek the recusal of the Panel members, though the record of the
recusal proceedings is not before us on appeal.
Upon review of the Complaint, we find no due process
claim asserted in the District Court.  Although the Complaint
asserts the District Court’s jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
through which an individual can seek damages for certain
constitutional deprivations, the Parents failed to allege any
misconduct by the Hearing Panel to the District Court.  Nor do
the Parents request any relief pursuant to § 1983.  Accordingly,
we will not address the merits of a constitutional argument for
the first time on appeal.  See Ross v. Hotel Emps. and Rest.
Emps. Int’l Union, 266, F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent
compelling circumstances an appellate court will not consider
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”) (quotations
and citations omitted).13
complaint presented pursuant to this section[.]”  20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  Thus, “a party seeking judicial
relief from the decision of state administrative proceedings may
do so only to the extent that the party sought such relief in those
proceedings.”  Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 186 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009).  As
a matter of chronology, a state administrative complaint could
not seek relief for a due process violation that had not yet
occurred.  Thus, any claim for deprivation of procedural due
process in the state administrative proceedings cannot be
redressed by the remedial provisions of the IDEA; the aggrieved
party must file a separate § 1983 action in the District Court,
supported by appropriate factual allegations.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment to the District and denial of
summary judgment to the Parents.
